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Dual-process theories of reasoning (e.g., Gilbert, 1991; Stanovich & West, 1997) posit 
that decisions are mediated by two cognitive systems: a fast and automatic system which 
sometimes relies on past knowledge, and a conscious and effortful system which is more 
likely to adhere to the rules of logic.  Dual-process accounts of memory (e.g., Joordens & 
Hockley, 2000) suggest that memory is influenced by two cognitive systems: a fast and 
automatic familiarity component, and a conscious and effortful recollection component.  
Both accounts suggest that cognition relies on two underlying systems, which are 
described similarly in the two literatures, suggesting some form of convergence in these 
two areas of research.  Memory research may therefore be informed by considering 
decision making research, and vice versa.  Combining these two theoretical perspectives, 
it follows that believable evidence should be less memorable than unbelievable evidence 
due to its shallow initial processing.  Despite this fact however, when inferences are 
being made based on evidence retrieved from memory, believable evidence should 
actually have a larger impact than it does when it is provided online, whereas no change 
or a lesser impact should be noted for unbelievable evidence.  Across 3 experiments these 
predictions are validated, suggesting that the impact of evidence on inferences depends 
not only on the believability of that evidence, but also on whether the decision is being 
made online or from memory. Specifically, memory-based inferences exaggerate the 
influence of believable but not unbelievable evidence, despite the fact that unbelievable 
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Several lines of research have begun to converge on the notion that, when 
evaluating information, humans are inherently sensitive to the believability of that 
information.  For example, in the Wason Selection task (e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982) 
participants must examine a set of cases to ensure that they do not violate some set rules.  
A typical example would be to have 4 cards presented, A, D, 3, and 7, and to inform 
participants that each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other.  
Furthermore, a rule such as “If there is an A on one side of the card then there must be a 3 
on the other side” would be given.  Usually, participants are unable to correctly solve this 
puzzle in its current, abstract form (the solution is to check the A and 7 card).  If the task 
is given semantic content however, the task becomes much more easily solved.  For 
example if participants are told they are police officers searching a bar for under-age 
drinkers, and the numbers and letters are changed to represent age and type of drink being 
consumed, participants are about 75% successful in the task (Griggs and Cox, 1982).  
Thus, it seems that prior knowledge plays some role in how participants conceptualize 
this task. 
Fugelsang and Thompson (2000; 2001) have also demonstrated that when 
evaluating potential causes, participants are sensitive not just to the degree of covariation 
between the potential cause and the effect, but also to the causes’ believability.  In fact, 
given two potential causes (a candidate and an alternative cause), participants are more 
likely to discount the candidate cause and endorse the alternative cause if the alternative 
cause is believable, even if the alternative cause covaries with the effect to a lesser degree 




Finally, Evans and colleagues (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005) have demonstrated that when solving syllogisms, believability and 
validity interact such that the role of logic plays a smaller role for syllogisms with 
believable conclusions.  That is, syllogisms with believable conclusions are more likely 
to be accepted than those with unbelievable conclusions.  Furthermore, the validity of 
conclusions has a smaller effect on acceptance when syllogisms are believable, 
suggesting logical considerations are adhered to less when believable conclusions are 
presented than when unbelievable conclusions are presented.  Thus, humans do not 
appear to evaluate information in an abstract, purely analytical fashion, but are inherently 
affected by the believability of information. 
Dual-Process Models of Human Reasoning 
Gilbert (1991) distinguishes between two possible models of human cognition, a 
Cartesian and Spinozan model.  According to a Cartesian model, individuals learning 
new information first understand the information, then in a subsequent stage of 
processing either accept or reject that information as true
1
.  A Spinozan model on the 
other hand, suggests that the act of learning new information also necessarily entails 
acceptance of that information as veridical, and that in the subsequent stage of processing 
individuals can possibly reject the information.  Gilbert cites a wide range of 
psychological research, from developmental research to sleep deprivation to linguistic 
research, that all converges on the notion that the Spinozan model is a more accurate 
model of human cognition.  The interesting aspect of this Spinozan account is it suggests 
                                                 
1
 Although the accounts presented by Gilbert focus on the truth of information, we will use the terms 
“truth” and “believability” interchangeably when discussing this model, under the assumption that, to the 
extent that individuals believe something is true, subjectively it is.  Thus, the notions of believability and 




that human cognition is indefinitely intertwined with believability, to the point where 
new information cannot even be understood without first being believed. 
From a Spinozan account then, information that is initially processed is 
automatically accepted as true.  This acceptance also is likely unconscious, as it occurs as 
soon as information is understood, and individuals often understand concepts without 
much conscious effort (see Gilbert, 1991 for a discussion on this point).  Obviously 
however, individuals do not believe everything that they hear.  Hence Gilbert (1991) 
points out that the second phase of processing in the Spinozan account is where 
participants can reject ideas as unbelievable or false.  Interestingly, this second phase of 
processing appears to be an effortful, conscious process as experimental manipulations 
that introduce a cognitive load have been demonstrated to reduce participants’ abilities to 
reject false information (e.g., Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993).  This dual-processing 
account of human reasoning therefore suggests that information is first processed in an 
automatic and potentially unconscious manner, such that information is both understood 
and accepted.  During a subsequent processing stage, which relies on conscious attention 
and effort, information that is unbelievable can be rejected. 
Stanovich and West (1997) have also put forth a dual-process account of human 
reasoning that shares many parallels with this Spinozan account and is actually 
theoretically compatible.  Stanovich and West however focus more on the details of the 
processing of the two systems, rather than the order in which they occur.  According to 
Stanovich and West, in System 1 (or the first processing stage of a Spinozan account) 
information is processed in an automatic, fast, and parallel manner.  It is this system 




but we will focus on these).  Furthermore, the processing of System 1 is not privy to 
conscious introspection, as only the output of this system is posted to consciousness.  
System 2 (or the second phase of processing in a Spinozan account) on the other hand, is 
a slow, deliberate, and serial processing system.  It is this system that takes into account 
abstract notions such as logic.  This system is conscious and open to introspection, but it 
also requires effort and attention, and is limited by working memory capacity.   
According to Stanovich and West (1997), it is the interaction of these two systems 
that give rise to belief biases.  Whereas processing by System 2 can lead to logically valid 
solutions to problems, System 1 processing will result in believable, but not necessarily 
logical, solutions being endorsed.  Indeed, experimental findings, such as those discussed 
previously on syllogisms (e.g., Evans et al., 1983) and causal relations (e.g., Fugelsang & 
Thompson, 2000), support the idea that although participants are sensitive to logical 
considerations, they are also biased by the believability of information.  Considering both 
Stanovich and West’s dual-process account and a Spinozan account together, we can 
arrive at the following general account of information processing: New information is 
first processed in System 1, whereby the default action is to understand and accept the 
idea.  Subsequently, in System 2, the newly acquired information is consciously 
scrutinized based on logical considerations.  To the degree that the information is 
believable however, it may receive little or no processing in System 2.  Thus, believable 
information is more likely to be processed primarily by System 1, whereas unbelievable 
information is more likely to be passed on from System 1 and processed more thoroughly 




Past researchers have made similar claims about the differential processing of 
believable and unbelievable information (e.g., Evans, 2003) and some empirical findings 
support the notion that believable information may be processed primarily in System 1 
whereas unbelievable information is more likely to receive additional processing in 
System 2.  For example, using a response deadline paradigm, Evans and Curtis-Holmes 
(2005) found that being forced to respond quickly primarily affected the accuracy of 
judging syllogisms with valid/unbelievable conclusions.  Although the speeded 
responding also affected syllogisms with invalid/believable conclusions, the effect was 
larger on the valid/unbelievable syllogisms.  If we assume that under speeded responding, 
the slower analytic system (i.e., System 2) has a weaker effect on responses, the larger 
impact on unbelievable syllogisms suggests that System 2 plays a larger role in 
processing unbelievable syllogisms than believable syllogisms. 
Thus, the dual-process account of reasoning we wish to focus on is one that 
combines the considerations of both a Spinozan model and of Stanovich and West’s 
(1997) System 1 and System 2 approach.  From our consideration, these two accounts of 
reasoning together suggests that information is first processed in System 1, and to the 
degree that it is unbelievable it may face more complex, conscious scrutiny in System 2.  
As a result, believable information is processed primarily in System 1 whereas 
unbelievable information is more likely to receive additional processing in System 2. 
Interestingly, in the area of memory research, dual-process accounts have also 
been proposed (e.g., Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder, Nhouyvansivong, Schunn, Ayers, 
Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000).  These dual-process accounts of memory suggest that memory 




component, and a conscious and effortful recollection component.  These two systems 
actually have many similarities with the two systems proposed by dual-process accounts 
of decision making.  Thus, it may be that the two areas of research, decision making and 
memory, have independently begun to converge.  If this is true, then both the areas of 
memory and decision making may be informed by one another.  Thus, we now turn to a 
consideration of the memory literature to examine how a dual-process account of 
decision making may fit with a dual-process account of memory. 
Dual-Process Reasoning and Memory 
Hastie and Park (1986) distinguish between two types of reasoning tasks: online 
and memory-based.  Online reasoning tasks provide participants with all necessary 
information to make decisions on each trial.  For example, Evans et al. (1983) provided 
participants with sets of premises and asked participants to judge how accurate the 
provided conclusions were.  This is an example of an online task, since all relevant 
information is available during the decision phase.  A memory-based reasoning task 
however requires participants to learn some information and later to make an inference 
based on that information.  To prevent participants from making online judgments as they 
learn information, participants are usually not informed what they will be using the 
information to decide about, or sometimes are not even told they will need to use the 
information to make a decision.  For example, in one experiment Hastie and Park had 
participants listen to a 5-min conversation between two men, and then subsequently 
participants judged the suitability of one of the men for a computer programming job.  




information would be used for.  At test then, participants had no choice but to rely on 
their memory of the conversation to make their decision. 
Although most studies in the area of judgment and reasoning focus on online 
tasks, memory-based tasks may be particularly relevant to real world situations.  For 
example, individuals in the real world often have to make decisions based on information 
that is not currently being presented to them.  Be it to successfully answer an exam 
question or to decide how much you enjoyed a movie, memory plays an important role in 
many decisions throughout our lives.  Of particular relevance given our previous 
discussion of believable and unbelievable information, may be how the believability of 
information interacts with its memorability.   
In a typical recognition memory experiment participants are shown a set of items 
to memorize during a study phase.  During the test phase, memory is tested by asking 
participants to classify items as either “old” (i.e., previously presented in the study phase) 
or “new”.  Correctly calling an old item “old” is called a hit whereas mistakenly calling a 
new item “old” is called a false alarm, and from these two measures memorability can be 
estimated.  Dual-process accounts of recognition memory (not to be confused with dual-
process accounts of reasoning) propose that performance on recognition memory tests 
can be explained in terms of recollection and familiarity (e.g., Joordens & Hockley, 2000; 
Reder et al., 2000).   
In terms of familiarity, it is assumed that items that feel familiar are simply more 
likely to elicit “old” responses regardless of their old/new status.  Familiarity is assumed 
to be influenced by factors such as perceptual fluency (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), in the 




Furthermore, familiarity is an automatic and unconscious process (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1996), such that participants believe familiar items are old, regardless of whether they 
actually are or not.  Thus, the familiarity of a stimulus set acts to both increase the hits 
and false alarms.  Nonetheless, items that were seen at study should feel more familiar to 
participants than foils, since the studied items were recently experienced (Jacoby & 
Whitehouse, 1989; Joordens & Merikle, 1992), therefore, based solely on familiarity 
based responding, hits should be higher than false alarms. 
However, a second factor, recollection, also helps increase hit rates.  Recollection 
represents the degree to which items can be consciously retrieved from memory.  As only 
studied items can be retrieved from memory, recollection acts only on old items and 
therefore boosts hit rates.  The degree of conscious recollection is often attributed to the 
degree of conscious attention or processing given during study (Joordens & Hockley, 
2000; Reder et al., 2000).  Thus, items that are distinctive (e.g., Geraci & Rajaram, 2002; 
Schmidt, 1991; Valentine, 1991) are often more consciously recollectable than other 
items.   
Hence, both familiarity and recollection can be used to recognize studied items.  
However, familiarity and recollection are assumed to be quite different.  Familiarity is 
believed to be more of an automatic, unconscious process (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) 
whereas recollection is believed to be an effortful, conscious process (Joordens & 
Hockley, 2000; Reder et al., 2000).  In terms of the results of a recognition memory test, 





The frequency-based mirror effect is the finding that low frequency words are 
more memorable than high frequency words, and that specifically, low frequency words 
have both a higher hit rate and lower false alarm rate than high frequency words (Glanzer 
& Adams, 1985).  In terms of the general memorability of believable versus unbelievable 
information, we may expect to see a similar pattern.  That is, the frequency-based mirror 
effect is usually explained by the dual-process account of memory by assuming that high 
frequency words have a higher false alarm rate than low frequency words because high 
frequency words are more familiar due to pre-experimental experience (Joordens & 
Hockley, 2000; Reder et al., 2000).  Based solely on familiarity we may expect both 
higher false alarm and hit rates for high frequency words.  But, low frequency words are 
assumed to be more distinctive than high frequency words as low frequency words are 
experienced less often (e.g., Geraci & Rajaram, 2002).  As a result, these items are easier 
to recollect than high frequency words therefore hit rates for low frequency items is 
boosted, beyond that of high frequency words, resulting in the full mirror effect. 
Our original rationale for considering memory literature was that dual-process 
theories of memory may be able to inform dual-process theories of decision making, and 
vice versa.  Thus, the frequency-based mirror effect may have an analogy in the decision 
making literature.  Specifically, turning to believable and unbelievable information we 
may expect to see a similar mirror effect.   
That is, the greater familiarity of high frequency words is hypothesized to give 
rise to the higher false alarms for these items.  According to our dual-process account of 
reasoning, when new information is perceived it is initially processed in System 1.  




System 1, believable information may be processed more fluently in this system.  That is, 
given that System 1 is assumed to rely on prior knowledge and beliefs, information that is 
consistent with these beliefs may be more fluently processed in this system than 
information which is not (i.e., unbelievable information).  As was mentioned previously, 
perceptual fluency is one factor that can help increase subjective feelings of familiarity 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), however others have advocated conceptual fluency as having 
similar effects on familiarity (e.g., Gregg, Gardiner, Karayianni, & Konstantinou, 2006).  
Thus, if believable information is processed more fluently in System 1 than unbelievable 
information, we would expect believable information to generally be more familiar than 
unbelievable information.  As a result, believable information should have both a higher 
hit rate and false alarm rate than unbelievable information, based solely on familiarity.   
However, based on conscious recollection, we may expect the hit rates for 
unbelievable information to actually surpass those of believable information, giving rise 
to a full mirror effect.  That is, unbelievable information was hypothesized previously to 
be more likely to receive additional processing in System 2 than believable information.  
Because System 2 processing was proposed to be conscious and attentive, System 2 
processing should be more likely to give rise to conscious recollection.  Therefore, 
unbelievable information should be more recollectable than believable information, 
which should result in a higher hit rate for these items, and a full mirror effect.  In line 
with this suggestion, Hastie and Kumar (1979) found that when participants were rating 
the personalities of hypothetical individuals, sentences describing characteristics which 




attributed these results to extra conscious processing these incongruent sentences elicited 
as participants attempted to reconcile the incongruent traits with the final trait rating.  
Thus, considering memory generally, it appears as if unbelievable information 
should be more memorable than believable information, but that specifically we may 
expect to see a mirror effect (i.e., more hits and fewer false alarms to unbelievable than 
believable information).  Additionally, the mechanisms which we have suggested that 
would give rise to this mirror effect are consistent with both models of memory and 
reasoning put forth.  That is, the idea that System 1 would give rise to familiarity is 
consistent with how both System 1 and familiarity have been characterized, as both have 
been suggested to be unconscious and automatic processes.  Furthermore, System 2 was 
previously described as an effortful and conscious processing of information, precisely 
the type of processing which was suggested to give rise to conscious recollection.  Thus, 
both memory and reasoning accounts seem to coincide nicely, and predict that a mirror 
effect should be observed between believable and unbelievable information, with 
superior memory for unbelievable information.  
The Impact of Memory on Evidence (Premises) 
Similar to some past work on logical reasoning (e.g., Evans et al., 1983), the 
current experiments were designed as reasoning tasks where participants would make 
judgments about the accuracy of some conclusion statements based on some premises.  
However, work on logical reasoning generally has focused on the believability of 
conclusions.  For example, in the syllogistic reasoning task used by Evans et al., 
participants are presented with two premises and a conclusion and must make some 




are either believable or unbelievable, whereas the two premises together are always 
neutral in terms of believability.  Our interest was on that of the believability of premises, 
not of conclusions.   
Thompson (1996) points out that while a large body of work has investigated how 
the believability of conclusions affects decisions, significantly less work has been done 
investigating the believability of premises.  Thompsons herself investigated the 
believability of premises and found that believable premises had a larger impact on 
decisions than did unbelievable premises.  Given that this area is relatively understudied 
and that manipulating the believability of premises allowed us to easily include a memory 
aspect to our experiments (i.e., participants could memorize believable or unbelievable 
premises and later judge conclusions based on those premises), it seemed reasonable to 
focus on believability of premises rather than of conclusions.  
On a more practical note however, focusing on the premises rather than the 
conclusions allows us to examine how the memorability of information affects decisions 
which are subsequently made.  Had we instead chose to focus on the memorability of 
conclusions, the memorability information would inform us about previously made 
decisions, and not about how any information will affect upcoming decisions.  Thus, by 
focusing on premises rather than conclusions we feel we are better able to combine the 
areas of memory and decision making. 
Another deviation from typical decision making methodology is that we chose not 
to use logical syllogisms but rather to use a less formal reasoning task.  That is, some 
work has demonstrated that participants may not generally perform logical tasks 




appear to indicate that these participants based their judgments about the accuracy of 
conclusions based solely on the conclusions themselves, ignoring the premises which 
they were supposed to evaluate.  Dickstein (1981) examined participants’ performance on 
a logical reasoning task and found, consistent with past work, that participants were 
unable to correctly reason through some types of syllogistic problems.  Dickstein argues 
that a large part of these errors are due to participants’ inability to differentiate between 
possible and necessary conclusions.  Finally, Roberts and Sykes (2003) across two 
experiments demonstrated that participants were unable to use logic correctly to reason 
through syllogisms.  Although a third experiment by Roberts and Sykes did demonstrate 
that participants may be able to use logic correctly in some situations, the bulk of their 
results simply reinforced that notion that most participants misunderstand or misuse the 
rules of logic. 
As a result of the potential problems with using logical syllogisms, we moved to 
an inferences task in which there are no logically correct answers.  Participants received 
evidence statements that could either be believable or unbelievable and then had to make 
an inference based on those statements.  Thus, from this point on we will no longer 
discuss “premises” or “conclusions” but instead discuss “evidence” and “inferences”, as 
these terms more accurately describe our paradigm.  As there were no logically correct 
answers to any of these questions, we used normative data to judge participants’ 
performance.  Furthermore by focusing on the believability of evidence instead of the 
inferences, we could easily introduce a memory element to our experiments, namely by 






If believable information is more likely to be processed primarily in System 1, we 
hypothesized this would lead to more familiarity-based responding to believable evidence 
on a memory test and in the end, result in poorer memory for believable evidence 
compared to unbelievable evidence.  However, when believable evidence is being 
retrieved from memory for the purposes of making an inference, this evidence may 
actually have a larger impact on inferences than when used online.  That is, when 
encoding believable evidence, that evidence will be largely processed in System 1, where 
information is processed automatically and integrated with prior knowledge and beliefs.  
Thus, it seems clear why believable evidence would not be very memorable if processed 
in System 1, as by being integrated with past knowledge, specifics and details of the 
information encoded may be lost, while the general gist or message of that information 
may be what is retained. 
When it comes to retrieving believable evidence, even though the exact verbatim 
item which was encoded may not be retrievable, many consistent and agreeable notions 
may be easily retrieved upon the attempt.  That is, the prior beliefs which the believable 
evidence was integrated with may be accidentally retrieved as participants attempt to 
retrieve the specific, believable piece of information.  Thus, even if participants fail to 
retrieve the specific believable evidence statement that was encoded during study, they 
may inadvertently retrieve numerous other pieces of information that all are consistent 
with the encoded item.  As a result, this may exaggerate the impact of believable 
evidence, as participants will have far more believable evidence to rely on than they 




believable evidence statement, “8% of men are color blind”.  Even if this specific item 
cannot be successfully retrieved, the retrieval attempt may begin to result in prior 
knowledge consistent with this statement being retrieved instead.  So facts like, “men 
don’t usually have good taste in color”, “my Dad never wears clothes that color-
coordinate”, “My brother can’t tell the different between red and orange” may all be 
retrieved.   
Prior research into item similarity has shown that when participants encounter a 
series of items which are easily integrated together, later memory tests demonstrate that 
participants may falsely recollect items that, although consistent with the set itself, were 
never presented.  For example, Roediger and McDermott (1995) demonstrated that when 
participants were shown a series of words (e.g., TIRED, PILLOW, BED) that were all 
related to an unpresented, critical lure (e.g., SLEEP), participants later falsely recollected 
the critical lure at test.  Roediger and McDermott suggested that as participants saw and 
integrated items at study, they inadvertently were also activating the critical lure in 
memory, and hence, that item was easily retrieved at test, even though it had not actually 
been presented (see also Deese, 1959 for similar findings). 
Thus, in terms of believable evidence, these findings suggest that if information 
can be easily integrated together, it becomes difficult for participants to correctly identify 
exactly which specific items were presented and which were not.  And critically, while 
attempting to retrieve certain items they may be inadvertently activating and perhaps 
even retrieving other items.  Thus, as believable evidence has been integrated with prior 
knowledge, any attempt to retrieve a specific believable evidence statement may 




evidence statement being sought.  The result is participants may actually end up with 
several pieces of evidence to support an inference, when they attempt to retrieve a single 
believable evidence statement.  Thus, believable evidence may have a larger impact on 
inferences when retrieved from memory.  
In terms of unbelievable evidence, we hypothesized this type of information 
should receive more processing in System 2 than believable information, thus eliciting 
more conscious attention and analytic processing.  This may result in information being 
encoded in a more analytic or abstract but conscious manner.  Furthermore this type of 
processing may be relatively free from the constraints of System 1.  That is, System 2 
processing would not necessarily integration information with prior knowledge or beliefs.  
Thus, System 2 processing should result in encoding that does not integrate information 
with prior knowledge or beliefs, but instead allocates more analytic and conscious effort 
to the information.  The result is that unbelievable evidence should be more consciously 
recollectable later on, than believable evidence.   
In terms of memory-based reasoning tasks, the fact that unbelievable evidence is 
consciously encoded in a recollectable manner may result in unbelievable evidence 
having an equivalent effect in both memory-based and online tasks.  That is, when 
unbelievable evidence is initially processed in System 1, it may not integrate well with 
prior knowledge since it is, by definition, inconsistent with prior knowledge.  
Furthermore, subsequent processing in System 2 likely considers the information in a 
more abstract manner than System 1.  Although this processing may lead to better 




Thus, unbelievable evidence may be encoded in such a way that specific surface details 
are retained.   
This more analytic and conscious encoding would support conscious recollection, 
and thus be compatible with our previous characterization of how unbelievable 
information is memorized.  A result of this less belief-integrated encoding however, 
would be that when participants attempt to retrieve an unbelievable piece of evidence, 
they would either retrieve the exact item from study, or else fail to recollect anything.  If 
an unbelievable piece of evidence was successfully retrieved, it should then have a 
similar effect on inferences as when it is provided in an online task.  Thus, to the degree 
that unbelievable information is successfully recollected, it should have an identical 
effect in memory-based tasks as when it is provided in an online task. 
Hence, due to the nature of how believable and unbelievable information is 
processed in System 1 and System 2 and how these systems interact with memory, a 
rather counterintuitive set of predictions can be generated.  Namely, my thesis is that 
unbelievable information should be more memorable than believable information, but 
interestingly, believable information should have a larger impact in memory-based tasks 
than in online tasks, whereas unbelievable information should have a similar effect or 
else a lesser effect in memory-based tasks than online tasks, depending on how 
successfully unbelievable items are recollected from memory.   
The current series of experiments were designed to test this theory regarding how 
believable and unbelievable information is processed, stored, and retrieved from memory.  
In Experiment 1, participants engage in an online task in which they are given either 




evidence provided.  This experiment serves as a baseline measure of how influenced 
participants are by different types of evidence, when that evidence is not being retrieved 
from memory.  Experiments 2 and 3 are memory-based tasks where participants are 
shown the believable and unbelievable evidence before making inferences.  Furthermore, 
in both experiments we test participants’ memories to look for evidence that believable 
and unbelievable evidence is being encoded in a manner consistent with the dual-process 
account of reasoning that we have outlined. 
To anticipate, Experiment 1 demonstrates that, in online tasks, believable 
evidence statements have a larger impact on inferences than unbelievable evidence 
statements.  Experiment 2 and 3 however, demonstrate that this effect reverses when 
evidence is being retrieved from memory to make inferences.  Furthermore, Experiment 2 
and 3 provide some evidence that unbelievable evidence may be more memorable than 
believable evidence statements.  The results of Experiment 3 in particular suggest that 
unbelievable evidence statements may be stored in a more verbatim manner, whereas 





 The goal of our study was to examine how believable and unbelievable evidence 
affect inference judgments and how memorability interacts with this effect.  Therefore, 
we needed a set of believable and unbelievable statements to use as stimuli throughout 
the series of experiments, as well as a set of statements that could be used to make 
inferences, based on the evidence statements.   
Method 
 Participants.  Forty-seven participants rated the believability of evidence 
statements and thirty-six rated the accuracy of inference statements.  All participants 
were from the University of Waterloo and for their participation participants received 0.5 
course credits towards their Introductory Psychology course. 
Materials.  To construct evidence statements, we searched the internet for short, 
interesting facts (e.g., “A blink lasts 0.3 seconds”).  In total 63 facts were found to be 
used as evidence statements.  Statements were selected such that they would be 
unfamiliar to most participants, would be clearly believable or unbelievable, and such 
that each contained a numerical value.  These statements were then categorized as either 
believable or unbelievable by the researcher.  Afterwards, for each believable evidence 
statement, the numerical value was changed to create an unbelievable evidence statement 
(e.g., “A blink lasts 2.5 seconds”), and similarly from each unbelievable statement the 
numerical value was changed to create a believable statement.  Thus, in the end we had 
constructed 63 believable and 63 unbelievable evidence statements, and each believable 
statement had a corresponding unbelievable version.  These pairings of believable and 




 In addition to evidence statements we needed inference statements.  That is, we 
needed statements which participants could use the evidence statements to make 
inferences about (e.g., “Blinks are large and noticeable motions”).  We constructed an 
inference statement for each evidence pair, which resulted in 63 inference statements.  
Furthermore, we decided to setup the inference such that the accuracy of the inference 
statement could either be supported or rejected based on the believability of the evidence 
sentence presented.  Although sometimes the believable statement would support the 
inference statement, other times it would refute it. That is, the believable and 
unbelievable statements always differentially supported the inference statement.  For 
example, one of the inference statements was, “Blinks are large and noticeable motions”.  
The inference participants were asked to make was, “based on the evidence we provided 
you, is this statement accurate?”  If participants had received the believable statement 
(i.e., “A blink lasts 0.3 seconds”) then clearly this inference statement is not supported.  If 
however participants received the unbelievable statement (i.e., “A blink lasts 2.5 
seconds”) then this inference is supported (at least to a greater degree).  Thus, for each 
inference statement there was no right or wrong answer, but merely degrees of support, 
with some evidence statements favoring the accuracy of an inference question, and others 
disputing it. 
 Procedure.  Participants completed the study on the internet.  After reading a 
consent form and confirming their identification, they were presented with a set of 
instructions which told them they would be rating the believability of statements (if they 
were rating evidence statements), or else the accuracy of statements (if they were rating 




of 1 to 7, how believable that statement was.  A rating of 1 indicated the statement was 
not believable and a rating of 7 indicated it was believable.  For inference statements, 
participants rated how accurate the statements were.  A rating of 1 indicated that the 
statement was inaccurate, whereas a rating of 7 indicated that the statement was believed 
to be true.   
Results & Discussion 
 The relevant results from these two experiments are the believability ratings of 
evidence statements and the accuracy ratings of inference statements.  No analyses were 
conducted on the data themselves as this data served merely as norming data to later be 
used as a baseline.  The full results of these experiments can be found in Appendix A.  
However, as only a subset of stimuli would be focused on in subsequent experiments, we 
















18% of a person’s income is 
spent on transportation 
4.91 For most people, transportation costs are 
easily afforded 
2.67 3.26 0.60 
In 1962, the first Wal-Mart 
opened up in Rogers, Arkansas 
4.70 Walmart is a relatively new company 4.58 3.18 1.40** 
The stomach of an adult can hold 
1.5 litres of material 
5.11 One jug of pop is enough to fill up an 
adult's stomach 
4.14 4.32 0.18 
Roses need 6 hours of sunlight 
per day to grow properly 
4.80 Roses can grow even with very little 
sunlight 
3.31 2.57 0.74* 
25% of injuries by athletes 
involve the wrist and hand 
4.62 Common injuries for athletes involve 
hands and wrists 
4.67 4.84 0.18 
38% of Americans eat breakfast 
everyday 
4.64 No one really eats breakfast every day 2.31 2.32 0.01 
women spend 55 minutes per 
day getting showered and 
dressed 
5.07 Women usually wake up an hour early to 
get ready in the morning 
4.97 4.77 0.20 
40% of the states in the U.S. 
have severe, or extreme pollution 
problems 
4.91 Pollution still isn't a major problem for 
most of the states in the US 
2.67 2.87 0.20 
5% of the people who use 
personal ads for dating are 
already married 
4.53 If you meet a person from a personal ad, 
chances are they are already married 
2.67 2.29 0.38 
8% of men are color blind 5.02 The reason most men are bad at colour-
coordinating is that they are colour blind 
2.28 2.26 0.01 
50% of lottery players go back to 
work after winning the jackpot 
4.67 Pretty much no one quits their job when 
they win the jackpot in a lottery 
3.25 2.89 0.36 
In the United States, 33% of land 
is covered by forests 
4.64 If you drive across the US most of the 
drive you will be driving through forests 















10% of all greeting cards are 
purchased by women 
2.44 Dads are more likely to buy greeting cards 
than moms 
2.22 3.58 1.36** 
It costs $10 to make a $1 bill in 
the United States 
2.31 It sometimes costs the government more 
to make a bill than the bill is worth 
3.14 5.61 2.47** 
A disposable diaper can hold up 
to 23 pounds of liquid 
2.36 Disposable diapers can hold the weight of 
several children 
3.19 2.66 0.54 
500 Valentine's Day cards are 
sent each year in North America 
2.47 Very few people actually send Valentine’s 
Day cards out 
3.17 4.63 1.46** 
A person passes gas every 10 
minutes 
2.44 Someone who passes gas a few times an 
hour is not having a normal day 
4.17 2.97 1.19** 
The average person falls asleep 
in 77 minutes 
2.51 People usually fall asleep pretty quickly 
when they go to bed at night 
3.83 2.84 1.00** 
The Snickers chocolate bar was 
invented in 1996 
2.24 Snickers has been around since the Great 
Depression 
3.94 2.21 1.74** 
A leech has 32 brains 2.23 You can't cut off a leeches head because 
it has brains all over its body 
2.89 3.95 1.06* 
A female mouse can produce up 
to 200,000 babies a year 
2.54 A handful of mice can produce millions of 
babies per year 
4.11 4.66 0.55 
Rats can only survive for 20 
minutes without any food 
2.04 Rats usually fast for several days at a time 
as food is usually scarce 
4.67 2.63 2.04** 
7% of weddings are held in a 
synagogue or church 
2.36 People usually get married in religiously 
sacred buildings 
4.75 3.00 1.75** 
Majority of brides plan their 
wedding for 5 years 
2.45 Most weddings are planned in under a 
year and therefore require the help of a 
wedding planner 
2.36 2.46 0.10 
       




Using this newly pre-tested data we now turn to our primary investigation.  The 
dual-process account we outlined in the Introduction suggests that believable information 
is more likely to be primarily processed in System 1, whereas unbelievable information is 
more likely to receive additional processing in System 2.  As a result of this differential 
processing, unbelievable information should be more memorable than believable 
information.  However, in terms of inferences, believable evidence should have a larger 
impact on inferences when it is being retrieved from memory than when it is being 
processed online.  Unbelievable information should have a similar effect or a lesser effect 
when being retrieved from memory than when processed online, depending on the degree 
to which it is accurately recollected.  To begin our investigation we first turn to an 






On the Believability of Evidence 
 Experiment 1 was designed to assess how much the accuracy ratings of inference 
statements change when believable or unbelievable evidence is presented to participants.  
So, if participants are presented with evidence either for or against an inference 
statement, will they change how accurate they judge that statement to be?  And 
furthermore, which type of evidence will more strongly affect decisions?  This 
experiment was conducted primarily to act as a baseline with which to compare later 
memory experiments.  
 Some past research has suggested that the believable information has a larger 
impact on decisions than does unbelievable information (e.g., Thompson, 1996).  
Although we hypothesized that, generally, participants may be more likely to utilize 
believable than unbelievable evidence when making inferences, with regard to this 
current experiment we did not believe a strong believability effect would emerge.  That 
is, to pre-rate our inference statements participants were asked to judge how accurate they 
believed each statement to be.  Likely, these judgments were based on participants’ prior 
knowledge and beliefs.  Therefore, if we were to then present participants with believable 
evidence (i.e., information they were previously using to rate the accuracy of inference 
statements), this may not result in a very large change in accuracy rating.  Thus, as 
unbelievable evidence is most likely to be inconsistent with participants’ prior beliefs, 
and because inference statements were likely pre-rated based on prior beliefs, 
unbelievable evidence statements may have a larger impact in terms of changing 




Yet, whether or not unbelievable evidence statements are found to have a larger 
impact on inferences than believable evidence statements is actually inconsequential to 
our primary investigation.  That is, we are not as concerned with the absolute impact of 
believability on inference statements, as much as we were interested in how memory 
interacts with the impact of believability on inferences.  Thus, the results of Experiment 1 
serve merely as a baseline with which to judge later, memory-based experiments. 
Method 
 Participants.  Thirty-nine participants from the University of Waterloo 
participated in the experiment for 0.5 bonus credits towards their Introductory 
Psychology course. 
Materials.  The evidence statements and inference statements used were from the 
pre-rated set described earlier (see Table 1).  We selected 12 believable and 12 
unbelievable evidence statements, where believability was based on participants’ pre-
ratings, not based on prior experimental labels.  As described previously, participants 
rated the believability of evidence statements on a 7-point Likert scale with 7 indicating 
high believability and 1 indicating low believability.  The 12 believable evidence 
statements selected had a mean believability rating of 4.80 (SD = 0.20) and the 12 
unbelievable evidence statements had a mean rating of 2.37 (SD = 0.14), t(22) = 34.48, p 
< .01.  None of these statements were from the same evidence pair.  This resulted in 24 
unrelated evidence statements where each was either believable or unbelievable.   
For each evidence statement we also selected the corresponding inference 
statement to accompany that evidence statement in the experiment.  Inference statements 




unbelievable evidence items had a mean accuracy rating of 3.54 (SD = 0.84), t(22) = 
0.60, p = 0.55.  Thus, inference statements were, on average, relatively neutral in terms of 
believability, or at least equivalent across evidence types.  An additional benefit of 
selecting these statements to have pre-ratings close to the center of the Likert scale was to 
allow room for the ratings to change when evidence was presented. 
 Procedure.  Participants completed the experiment on the internet.  After reading a 
consent form, participants were instructed that they would be engaged in an inference 
task.  On each trial, participants would see an evidence statement and an inference 
statement.  Their task was to read both statements and judge how accurate the inference 
statement was based on the assumption that the evidence statement was true.  Instructions 
read as follows: 
 
In the following experiment you will be asked to rate the believability of a series 
of statements.  Before each statement we will first tell you a fact (e.g., "A dime 
has 118 ridges around the edge").  Please treat this fact as true, regardless of 
whether or not you believe it.  Following the fact we will show you a statement 
(e.g., "It's pretty hard to count all the ridges on a dime").  Your task is to tell us, 
based only on the fact we provided, how believable you think that statement is.  
So for example, if you think that counting all the ridges on a dime, assuming it 






To indicate how accurate you believe the statement to be, use the scale below the 
statement.  The scale will range from 1-7.  A 1 indicates that you do not think the 
statement is accurate, and hence, do not believe it.  A 7 indicates you do think the 
statement is accurate, and hence, you do believe it.  Intermediate values indicate 
an intermediate level of certainty about believability; for example, a 4 indicates 
that you think the statement may or may not be accurate.  That is, the statement 
seems somewhat believable, but also somewhat unbelievable.  Try your best to be 
as accurate as you can when evaluating the statements.  If you see a statement 
which you are unsure about, go with your best intuition about how believable it 
seems. 
 
Thus, participants were instructed to treat the evidence statement as true, 
regardless of whether they actually believed it or not, and judge the inference statement’s 
accuracy based on this information.  Participants rated the accuracy of the inference 
statement on a 7-point Likert scale, identically to the pre-rating phase. 
Results & Discussion 
 A preliminary analysis at the item level can be seen in Table 1.  For each 
inference statement, the degree of judged accuracy from pre-rating values was compared 
to the degree of judged accuracy from Experiment 1, and the amount of change in judged 
accuracy was noted.  For inference statements presented with believable evidence, only 2 
of the 12 items had significantly changed compared to 9 of the 12 inference statements 




analysis revealed that, consistent with our predictions, believable evidence had a lesser 
effect than unbelievable evidence on ratings of inference statements. 
However, the more relevant analysis is one conducted at the participant level.  
Specifically, for each inference judgment for each participant we calculated the absolute 
difference between the judged accuracy of the inference statement and the average pre-
rating judgment for that particular inference statement.  The result is, for each participant 
we had a measure of how much that participants’ judgments of inference statements 
differed from the average pre-rating values.  This new variable, which we term absolute 
inference change (as we disregarded the sign for this variable), provided a more accurate 
measure of how much believable and unbelievable evidence statements affected inference 
judgments, at a participant level.  For example, if a participant rated a particular inference 
statement as 4 in terms of accuracy, but the pre-rating average rating for that statement 
was 2.4, an absolute difference of 1.6 would be calculated for that participant for that 
trial, indicating that seeing evidence caused an accuracy judgment that was 1.6 units 
deviant from the normed value.  It is these absolute inference changes which we now turn 
to. 
 One sample t-tests, tested against zero, were used to test the absolute inference 
change for inferences read with believable and unbelievable evidence statements.  These 
tests revealed that inferences made with both believable (M = 1.49, SD = 0.39) and 
unbelievable (M = 2.00, SD = 0.52) evidence statements caused a significant change in 
accuracy judgments relative to the normative data, t(38) = 24.11, p < .01,and t(38) = 
24.18, p < .01, respectively.  Thus, at the participant level, both believable and 




unbelievable evidence caused a larger change in accuracy judgments than did believable 
evidence, t(38) = 4.94, p < .01.  Thus, it appears that although both believable and 
unbelievable evidence statements changed the inferences participants made, participants 
were nonetheless most affected by unbelievable evidence. 
 Earlier we suggested that this fact may have been a result of the subjective nature 
of our task.  That is, responses to inferences had been pre-rated by participants who were 
likely using prior knowledge when judging the accuracy of inference statements.  Thus, 
as believable evidence would merely support prior knowledge, providing participants 
with believable evidence may have done little to change these accuracy ratings.  As such, 
it is not surprising to find that believable evidence had a smaller impact on inferences 
than did unbelievable evidence. 
 However, another interpretation is that unbelievable evidence statements in this 
experiment were more unbelievable than believable statements were believable.  That is, 
unbelievable evidence statements had a mean rating of 2.37.  This means that 
unbelievable statements, on average, were 1.37 units above the lowest point on the Likert 
rating scale (i.e., 1).  Believable evidence statements on the other hand had a mean rating 
of 4.80, indicating that, on average, they were 2.20 units below the highest point on the 
Likert rating scale (i.e., 7).  If we assume that the degree of believability or 
unbelievability of evidence directly predicts the change in inferences observed, then it is 
not surprising to find that unbelievable evidence statements had a larger impact on 
inferences than did believable evidence statements. 
 Yet, as discussed before, the exact reason why unbelievable evidence statements 




inconsequential to our primary investigation.  As we were not as concerned with the 
absolute impact of believability on inference statements but rather, the relative change in 
impact between an online and a memory-based task, the results of Experiment 1 serve 
merely as a baseline with which to judge later, memory-based experiments. 
  One final point of interest is that, although we have argued that believable 
evidence has a smaller impact on inferences than does unbelievable evidence in this 
online task, remarkably believable evidence still had a substantial effect.  That is, given 
one piece of believable evidence, inferences changed on average 1.49 points, versus 
unbelievable evidence changing inferences 2.00 points.  Although we have suggested that 
because pre-rating values were based on prior beliefs that believable evidence should 
have a smaller effect than unbelievable evidence, and this was borne out, clearly 
believable evidence still has a relatively large impact on inferences.  That is, its impact is 
closer to that of unbelievable evidence (i.e., 2.00) than it is to no impact at all (i.e., zero).  
Hence, although we have claimed believable evidence has a lesser impact than 
unbelievable evidence in an online inference task, it should be made clear that believable 
evidence still has a significant effect, that is in some sense, comparable to that found for 
unbelievable evidence.  
 To summarize then, both an item-level and participant-level analysis revealed 
that, as was suggested may be the case, unbelievable evidence statements affected 
participants’ inference judgments to a greater degree than did believable evidence 
statements.  This result may be due to the fact that there are no objective correct answers 
in our experiments, and therefore judgments in this experiment are compared to pre-




possess.  Alternatively it may be due to the fact that unbelievable evidence statements 
were more unbelievable than believable evidence statements were believable.  
Regardless, these results could now be used as a baseline for how believability affects 
inferences in our task when inferences are made online.  We now turn to our investigation 





The Interaction Between Evidence Believability and Memorability 
 Experiment 1 demonstrates that in the online version of our inferences task, 
unbelievable evidence has a larger impact on inferences than does believable evidence.  
Based on our earlier discussion of the dual-process account of reasoning however, we 
may expect to see different results in Experiment 2, where a memory-based inferences 
task is used instead.  That is, the dual-process account of reasoning we outlined in the 
Introduction, suggest that believable information is more likely to be primarily processed 
by System 1, whereas unbelievable information is more likely to receive additional 
processing by System 2.  The result of these processing differences is that believable 
evidence should be encoded differently than unbelievable evidence.  Whereas believable 
evidence may be encoded more automatically and in a manner which integrates it with 
existing knowledge, unbelievable information should be less integrated with existing 
knowledge (because it is inconsistent with that knowledge) and encoded in a more 
conscious and abstract manner. 
As we considered the issue earlier we suggested that in a recognition memory test, 
a mirror effect may be observed between believable and unbelievable evidence.  Namely, 
believable evidence may be more familiar than unbelievable evidence but unbelievable 
evidence may be more consciously recollectable than believable evidence.  This should 
result in a mirror effect and specifically, superior memory for unbelievable evidence.  In 
terms of inferences however, we predicted that an interesting interaction between 
memorability and believability may occur.  That is, we suggest that because believable 




integrated with prior knowledge.  Attempts to retrieve specific items to base inferences 
upon may inadvertently result in several pieces of evidence, all consistent with the one 
integrated, being accidentally retrieved.  Regardless of whether or not participants are 
consciously aware of this fact, the fact that more evidence is now present on which to 
base inferences should result in more extreme changes in inferences compared to an 
online task.  Thus, believable evidence statements should have a larger impact on 
inferences in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. 
For unbelievable evidence statements, we hypothesized that these items would not 
integrate well with prior knowledge during System 1’s initial processing.  Additionally, 
subsequent processing in System 2 would also not integrate these items with prior 
knowledge, although it would make them more consciously recollectable.  Thus, when 
attempting to retrieve an unbelievable evidence statement in order to make an inference, 
participants may be relatively successful in recollecting the exact item from memory.  
Furthermore, no additional evidence would likely be retrieved, since the unbelievable 
evidence was not integrated with prior knowledge, retrieval attempts should not lead to 
other evidence being accidentally retrieved.  The result is that, to the degree unbelievable 
evidence statements can be consciously recollected, they should affect inferences more or 
less to the same degree they would if they were simply provided to participants, as in 
Experiment 1.  Thus, unbelievable evidence statements should affect inferences to a 
similar degree as in Experiment 1, or if they are not perfectly recollectable, to a 







 Participants.  Twenty-six participants from the University of Waterloo 
participated in the experiment for 0.5 bonus credits towards their Introductory 
Psychology course. 
Materials.  The 24 evidence statements from Experiment 1 were used as the study 
items in this experiment.  Twenty-four new evidence statements were also selected for 
this experiment to act as foils during the recognition memory test (see Table 2).  These 
items were all unrelated to the study items; hence, 12 new believable and 12 new 
unbelievable statements were obtained.  From the pre-rating data, the 12 new believable 
statements had a mean believability rating of 4.89 (SD = 0.56) and the unbelievable 
statements had a rating of 2.12 (SD = 0.33).  Finally, the 24 inference statements from 













Chopsticks originated from China 4,000 
years ago 5.26  A blink lasts 2.5 seconds 1.93 
McDonald's restaurant has over 1.5 
million employees all over the world 6.13  75% of the population is left-handed 1.96 
The United States Postal Service 
handles 40% of the world's mail volume 4.46  
It takes 2 weeks for food to be 
broken down in the human stomach 1.91 
Each day 14 people die from asthma in 
North America 4.48  
Men live 15 years longer than 
women do 1.85 
People spend 33% of their life sleeping 4.87  
700,000 people have been frozen 
after their death 2.60 
American models are skinnier than 98% 
of American women 5.63  
Heinz first started making ketchup in 
1233 AD 1.82 
An average American eats 60 hot dogs 
per year 4.49  
In a year, an American kid eats 3 
slices of pizza 1.64 
90% of Pumpkins sold are for decoration 5.07  
8% of candles that are purchased 
are purchased by women 2.13 
Alaska has 2 times as many caribou as 
people 4.42  
17% of children go out trick or 
treating for Halloween 2.50 
31% of employees skip lunch entirely 4.93  
70% of the human population reside 
in deserts 2.47 
33% of accidental deaths occur in the 
home 4.43  
Hitler was voted Time Magazine's 
man of the year in 1981 2.59 
Only 4% of babies are born on their 
actual due date 4.46  
The world's tallest roller coaster 






 Procedure.  The experiment was conducted on the internet.  After reading a 
consent form, participants were informed they would participate in a 3-part study.  In the 
first phase of the experiment, participants engaged in a study phase.  During the study 
phase the 24 evidence statements from Experiment 1 were shown, one at a time.  
Participants read each sentence then clicked a button to continue.  They were instructed 
to remember each statement as best as possible because later we would be testing their 
memory.  After the study phase participants engaged in a memory test.
2
  In the memory 
test, the 24 items from study were intermixed with 24 new, unrelated evidence 
statements.  For each statement participants had to indicate whether the item was old 
(present at study) or new.  Participants used a radio button on the website to indicate their 
decision on each trial and clicked a button to continue.  During the final phase of the 
experiment, participants saw the 24 inference statements from Experiment 1 and were 
instructed to judge the accuracy of these inference statements based on the evidence read 
at study.  As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to treat the statements from the 
study phase as true when making inferences, regardless of what they really thought of 
them. 
Results & Discussion 
 The results were analyzed in two parts.  First we analyzed the memory data to 
examine what effects, if any, were present.  Then we examined the inference judgments 
to see how these judgments differed from Experiment 1, under the assumption that any 
                                                 
2
 We opted to use a fixed order for the three phases of this experiment.  This was because a set of early pilot 
data revealed that if participants engaged in the inference task before the memory task, significantly 
different results in the memory task were revealed.  For the inference task however, it did not matter which 
order it occurred.  That is, if it occurred before or after the memory test, the results were nearly identical, 




differences noted were a result of participants having to remember evidence, rather than 
just have it provided to them. 
 Memory Test.  The recognition memory data is presented in Table 3.  Recall that 
the mirror effect is the finding of a greater hit rate but lower false alarm rate to one 
stimulus class over another.  We also hypothesized that unbelievable evidence statements 
would be more recollectable than believable evidence statements, resulting in a greater 
hit rate.  Additionally, believable evidence statements in general would be processed 
more fluently in System 1 than unbelievable evidence statements, resulting in more false 
alarms.  Thus, a mirror effect was predicted to be found such that unbelievable evidence 
statements were more memorable than believable evidence statements, and specifically 
had more hits and fewer false alarms than believable evidence statements. 
From hits and false alarms we calculated d’ for both believable and unbelievable 
statements.  The statistic d’ is often considered a more comprehensive measure of 
memory than either hits or false alarms alone and is better able to represent memorability 
of items without being susceptible to issues of bias.  Thus, d’ was taken as our general 
measure of memorability, whereas hits and false alarms were examined to look for the 
specific mirror effect pattern we had predicted.   
The data were analyzed in a 2 (old vs. new) X 2 (believable vs. unbelievable 
evidence statement) within-subjects ANOVA.  Participants could successfully 
discriminate old from new items, F(1, 25) = 762.85, MSe = 0.03, p < .01, η
2
 = .97.  
Additionally, although there was no difference in response to believable and unbelievable 
evidence statements generally, F < 1, there was a borderline significant interaction, F(1, 
25) = 3.39, MSe = 0.002, p = .08, η
2




unbelievable evidence statements were nearly more memorable (i.e., higher d’) than 
believable evidence statements. 
Paired-sample t-tests revealed that, although the trends in the means trended in a 
direction consistent with a mirror effect (i.e., more hits and fewer false alarms to 
unbelievable than believable evidence), neither the hit rate difference, t(25) = 0.30, p = 
.77, nor the false alarm rate difference was significant, t(25) = 1.47, p = .15.  A main 
reason for this failure to find significance seemed to be that the recognition memory test 
was so easy that the data was contaminated by floor and ceiling effects.  Indeed, 11 of the 
26 participants had hits for both believable and unbelievable evidence statements of 1.00.  
Additionally, 23 of 26 participants had false alarms for both believable and unbelievable 
evidence statements of 0.   
 
Table 3.  Means (and Standard Deviations) for hits, false alarms, and d’ noted for 
believable and unbelievable evidence statements in Experiment 2. 
 Evidence Type 
  Believable Unbelievable 
Hits .93 (.11) .94 (.12) 
False Alarms .04 (.13) .01 (.03) 
d' .95 (.10) .97 (.08) 
 
From the perspective that we had actually anticipated unbelievable statements to 
be more memorable than believable statements, it would make sense to conduct one-
tailed tests when examining the memorability data.  If we adopt this approach, then 
unbelievable evidence statements are more memorable than believable evidence 
statements (i.e., p < .05).  Although perhaps a somewhat liberal approach, given that the 




remarkable that any noticeable pattern emerged at all.  Furthermore, given our theoretical 
consideration of the memorability of believable and unbelievable information, we had 
strong a priori predictions that unbelievable statements would be more memorable than 
believable statements.  Thus, we feel it is acceptable in this case to report that 
unbelievable statements were more memorable than believable statements, although 
clearly the difference in memorability is not large. 
 Inference Phase.  As in Experiment 1, we were concerned with the relative 
difference between accuracy judgments of inference statements in this experiment as 
compared to the normative data.  Thus, we examined the absolute inference change of 
inferences made based on believable and unbelievable evidence statements.  As 
mentioned previously, absolute inference change provides a measure at the participant 
level as to how much change in inference judgments was noted in this experiment as 
compared to the pre-rating data, where no evidence was provided. 
As was found in Experiment 1, a comparison of absolute inference changes 
against zero revealed that in this experiment both believable (M = 1.99, SD = 0.43) and 
unbelievable evidence (M = 1.69, SD = 0.38) significantly altered accuracy judgments 
compared to the normative data, t(25) = 23.72, p < .01, and t(25) = 22.84, p < .01, 
respectively.  However, unlike Experiment 1, believable evidence statements impacted 
inferences more than did unbelievable evidence, t(25) = 3.40, p < .01. 
A 2 (believable vs. unbelievable evidence) X 2 (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted to directly compare the results of Experiment 1 and 2.  
No main effect for the impact of believability of evidence was found, F(1, 63) = 1.35, 
MSe = 0.16, p = .25, η
2




34.22, MSe = 0.16, p = .23, η
2
 = .02.  However, there was a significant interaction, F(1, 
63) = 34.22, MSe = 0.16, p < .01, η
2
 = .36.  This interaction indicated that the impact of 
the believability of evidence varied depending on the experiment in question.  To further 
investigate this interaction, independent-sample t-tests were used to compare the impact 
of the believability of evidence between Experiment 1 and 2.   
As predicted, believable evidence statements had a larger impact in this memory-
based experiment, than in an online task, t(62) = 5.18, p < . 01, d = 1.32.  Additionally, 
unbelievable evidence statements had a lesser impact on inferences in this memory-based 
experiment, than in the online task in Experiment 1, t(62) = 2.64, p < .01, d = 0.67.  Thus, 
as suggested would be the case, believable evidence statements have a larger impact on 
inferences when retrieved from memory than when explicitly provided.  Additionally, 
this specific experiment found that unbelievable evidence statements may have a lesser 
impact on inferences when retrieved from memory then when provided.  According to 
our dual-process account of reasoning, this suggests that in Experiment 2, unbelievable 
evidence statements may not have been perfectly recollectable, as to the degree they are 
clearly recollectable we predicted they should have a similar effect on inferences as in 
Experiment 1. 
 Generally then, the findings from Experiment 2 are in line with the dual-process 
account of reasoning we have laid out.  Although we did not find strong evidence that 
this difference in memorability exists, ceiling and floor effects in the hits and false alarms 
respectively likely contributed to this issue.  Thus, we now turn to Experiment 3 with 
three goals in mind.  First, to again demonstrate that when believable and unbelievable 




does when it is provided (i.e., as in Experiment 1).  Second, we wished to make the 
memory test more difficult, with the hopes of observing a clear memory benefit for 
unbelievable evidence.  Thirdly, we wished to add another aspect to the memory test in 
order to investigate our hypothesis that unbelievable evidence statements are stored in a 
more detail-specific manner than are believable statements.  Namely, by introducing the 
alternative member of evidence pairs of old items to act as superficially related foils at 
test.  By replicating those results found in our inferences phase and obtaining clearer 
results in our memory test, we hope to provide stronger support for the specific 





Investigating the Memory Hypothesis 
 Experiment 3 was an extension of Experiment 2, in an attempt to better ascertain 
if there are any memory differences between believable and unbelievable statements, and 
if these differences are consistent with our theory.  The dual-process account of reasoning 
we put forth previously proposed that unbelievable evidence should be better recognized 
than believable evidence, and that this may manifest specifically as a mirror effect.  
Although Experiment 2 did not find strong evidence that unbelievable statements are 
better recognized than believable statements, this was likely hindered by floor and ceiling 
effects.  Thus, in Experiment 3 we sought to first increase the difficultly of the memory 
test by introducing relatedness among the foils.  That is, instead of simply using the 24 
unrelated foils from Experiment 2, we used the 24 foils from Experiment 2 and the foils’ 
corresponding statements from the evidence pairs (see Table 4).  For example, “A blink 
lasts 2.5 seconds” was used as a foil in Experiment 2, therefore both that and “A blink 




Table 4.  Superficially related foils to previously studied evidence statements (see Table 1) and previously used foils (see Table 2). 








49% of a person’s income is spent on 
transportation 3.41  
93% of all greeting cards are 
purchased by women 5.11 
In 1991, the first Wal-Mart opened up in 
Rogers, Arkansas 3.23  
It costs 3 cents to make a $1 bill in 
the United States 4.47 
The stomach of an adult can hold 20 
litres of material 2.93  
A disposable diaper can hold up to 7 
pounds of liquid 4.50 
Roses need 20 minutes of sunlight per 
day to grow properly 4.18  
1 billion Valentine's Day cards are 
sent each year in North America 5.39 
4% of injuries by athletes involve the 
wrist and hand 3.42  A person passes gas every 2 hours 4.76 
6% of Americans eat breakfast everyday 3.07  
The average person falls asleep in 
12 minutes 4.36 
women spend 3 hours per day getting 
showered and dressed 3.38  
The Snickers chocolate bar was 
invented in 1930 4.91 
90% of the states in the U.S. have 
severe, or extreme pollution problems 4.11  A leech has 1 brain 5.13 
62% of the people who use personal ads 
for dating are already married 3.07  
A female mouse can produce up to 
100 babies a year 4.67 
71% of men are color blind 2.80  
Rats can survive up to 14 days 
without any food 4.93 
92% of lottery players go back to work 
after winning the jackpot 4.28  
85% of weddings are held in a 
synagogue or church 5.02 
In the United States, 87% of land is 
covered by forests 2.85  
Majority of brides plan their wedding 













Chopsticks originated from China 100 
years ago 2.91  A blink lasts 0.3 seconds 5.76 
McDonald's restaurant has over 2,300 
employees all over the world 3.56  15% of the population is left-handed 5.15 
The United States Postal Service 
handles 99% of the world's mail volume 2.89  
It takes 3 hours for food to be broken 
down in the human stomach 4.78 
Each day 1.2 million people die from 
asthma in North America 2.62  
Women live 7 years longer than men 
do 5.67 
People spend 62% of their life sleeping 3.65  
90 people have been frozen after 
their death 4.07 
American models are skinnier than 12% 
of American women 2.91  
Heinz first started making ketchup in 
1876 5.20 
An average American eats 7 hot dogs 
per year 2.87  
In a year, an American kid eats 46 
slices of pizza 4.76 
15% of Pumpkins sold are for decoration 3.80  
96% of candles that are purchased 
are purchased by women 5.15 
Alaska has 100 times as many people 
as caribou 3.16  
93% of children go out trick or 
treating for Halloween 4.84 
85% of employees skip lunch entirely 3.29  
30% of the human population reside 
in deserts 3.86 
99% of accidental deaths occur in the 
home 2.84  
Hitler was voted Time Magazine's 
man of the year in 1938 3.95 
79% of babies are born on their actual 
due date 3.80  
The world's tallest roller coaster 






  By using related foils we hoped to increase the difficulty of the memory test.  
That is, past research has shown that increased perceptual fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981) can increase the subjective feelings of familiarity to those items.  Because foil pairs 
were virtually identical to one another, save for one number being altered, we believed 
that these items could serve to increase each other’s perceptual fluency, or provide the 
false sense of recent exposure.  That is, after seeing “A blink lasts 2.5 seconds”, if 
participants later see “A blink lasts 0.3 seconds”, this second foil should actually be 
processed more fluently than the first foil which should lead to an increased sense of 
familiarity.  This false sense of familiarity should cause participants to be more likely to 
believe they saw this second foil on the study list, when in fact it they did not.  Thus, each 
foil had a related foil mixed in at test.  In this manner, participants should have a harder 
time discriminating old from new items, as both old and new items would feel familiar to 
participants. 
 However, a more relevant goal was to specifically test how believable and 
unbelievable information may be encoded.  That is, we have supposed the unbelievable 
evidence statements are stored in a more detail-specific manner due to System 2 
processing whereas believable statements are more likely to be integrated with prior 
knowledge due to System 1 processing.  Although this account predicts that there should 
be a memory advantage for unbelievable than believable items, simpler accounts could 
also predict this effect.  For example, if we simply assume that unbelievable evidence 
statements are more surprising or require more processing time, we would likely predict 
they should also show superior memory than believable evidence statements.  This 




System 1 and System 2 processing distinction.  Thus, a stronger test of our dual-process 
account of reasoning would be to demonstrate that unbelievable evidence statements are 
not only more memorable than believable evidence statements, but are more memorable 
for the specific reasons our account suggests. 
 One way to examine the details of memory is to investigate what types of items 
participants false alarm to.  That is, our account suggests that believable evidence is more 
likely to be encoded in such a way that details are lost because it has been integrated with 
prior knowledge (due to System 1 processing), whereas unbelievable evidence is less 
likely to be encoded in this manner (due to System 2 processing).  If this is so then 
participants should false alarm more for superficially related but contradictory foils for 
unbelievable statements, as these foils would be more easily matched to unbelievable 
items.  That is, if an unbelievable statement is stored in terms of details, and the exact 
details can be retrieved, then sentences that share many of those details should cause a 
false alarm, even if the sentences differ on some conceptual aspects.  So if the 
unbelievable statement, “The average person falls asleep in 77 minutes” is memorized at 
study, and at test the superficially related foil “The average person falls asleep in 12 
minutes” is shown, participants should be likely to false alarm to this foil.  This is 
because the foil shares many surface features with the unbelievable statement, and we 
hypothesize that these are the details that are readily stored for unbelievable statements.     
For believable statements however, false alarms to superficially related foils 
should be significantly lower.  That is, believable evidence statements are integrated with 
prior knowledge, fewer specific details of the items should be encoded.  As a result, the 




on participants’ judgments.  Further, the foils would obviously differ from the encoded 
believable statements, as they would be incompatible with prior knowledge.  Thus, 
participants should readily reject these foils.   
For example, if the believable statement “Roses need 6 hours of sunlight per day 
to grow properly” is read at study, we hypothesize that this information will become 
integrated with prior knowledge and surface characteristics may be lost.  As a result, 
participants may simply remember something like “roses need a day of sun to grow”.  If 
the superficially related foil “Roses need 20 minutes of sunlight per day to grow 
properly” is shown at test, participants should be less likely to false alarm to it.  This is 
because, although this item shares lots of surface characteristics with the studied item, 
those surface characteristics were not encoded or stored well.  Furthermore, as the 
believable statement from study was readily integrated with prior knowledge, it becomes 
obvious that the foil is inconsistent with prior knowledge, and so could not have been the 
item that was seen at study.  Thus, participants may realize this and not false alarm to this 
foil. 
 To sum up, we will use the 24 items from the evidence pairs that correspond to 
the studied items as superficially related but contradictory foils during the memory test.  
We hypothesize that if unbelievable and believable evidence statements are being 
encoded and stored as we suggest, then we should see a higher false alarm rate to foils 
that are superficially related to unbelievable studied statements than believable studied 
statements.  In addition, examining hits and false alarms for unrelated statements should 
reveal a memory advantage for unbelievable over believable evidence statements.  




this experiment than in Experiment 1.  Unbelievable evidence statements should impact 
inferences to a similar degree as in Experiment 1 or else to a lesser degree, depending on 
how consistently unbelievable items can be recollected from memory. 
Method 
 Participants.  Thirty-nine participants from the University of Waterloo 
participated in the experiment for 0.5 bonus credits towards their Introductory 
Psychology course.  Two participants exhibited unusual memory test results, having false 
alarm rates equal to or greater than hit rates.  This indicated that these participants either 
were not completing the task correctly, or had not understood the instructions.  As a 
result these participants were dropped from all subsequent analyses.  Therefore, data from 
37 participants was examined in Experiment 3. 
 Materials.  The stimuli from Experiment 2 were used in this experiment.  
Additionally, for both the study items and foils from Experiment 2 we also obtained the 
related items from each evidence pair (see Table 4).  Thus, at test there were 24 old items, 
24 foils, 24 foils which were superficially related to the first set of foils, and 24 foils that 
were superficially related to the old items. 
Procedure.  The experiment was conducted on the internet.  It was conducted 
identically to Experiment 2.  The one difference was that in Experiment 3 we used 72 
foils during the memory test, not 24 (See Table 4 for a complete list of all foils).   
Results & Discussion 
 Similar to Experiment 2, the results of Experiment 3 were analyzed in two parts.  




 Memory Test.  The memory data are presented in Table 5.  False alarms were 
calculated as the proportion of “old” responses to any of the foils.  The superficially 
related foils were treated separately from the typical false alarms (i.e., false alarms to the 
foils which were unrelated to the old items).  Before turning to those data however, we 
first examine hits and the false alarms to foils that were unrelated to the old items, which 
we will term “typical” false alarms.   
 
Table 5.  Means (and Standard Deviations) for hits, false alarms, d’, and false alarms to 
superficially related foils noted for believable and unbelievable evidence statements in 
Experiment 3. 
 Evidence Type 
  Believable Unbelievable 
Hits .86 (.12) .90 (.13) 
False Alarms .03 (.04) .02 (.03) 
d' .91 (.07) .94 (.07) 
Related Foils .03 (.04) .09 (.11) 
 
For the hits and typical false alarms we had identical predictions in this 
experiment as in Experiment 2.  Namely, unbelievable evidence statements should be 
more memorable than believable evidence statements, and specifically that a mirror effect 
should be present with more hits and fewer false alarms to unbelievable than believable 
evidence statements.  As before, d’ was taken as our general measure of memorability 
while hits and false alarms were also examined to look for the specific mirror effect we 
had predicted. 
The recognition memory data were analyzed in a 2 (old vs. new) X 2 (believable 




discriminate old from new items, F(1, 36) = 1894.33, MSe = 0.01, p < .01, η
2
 = .98, and 
although there was no overall main effect of statement believability, F(1, 36) = 2.44, MSe 
= 0.004, p = .13, η
2
 = .06, there was an interaction between old/new status and 
believability, F(1, 36) = 6.99, MSe = 0.004, p < .05, η
2
 = .16, which indicated that 
unbelievable evidence statements were more memorable (i.e., higher d’) than believable 
evidence statements.   
Paired sample t-tests revealed that this interaction indicated a mirror effect (i.e., 
more hits and fewer false alarms to one unbelievable than believable evidence 
statements) may be present in the data.  That is, hit rates for unbelievable evidence 
statements were higher than for believable evidence statements, t(36) = 2.25, p < .05, and 
false alarm rates were marginally lower for unbelievable than for believable evidence 
statements, t(36) = 1.82, p = .08.  Thus, although unbelievable evidence statements were 
more memorable than believable evidence statements, and some evidence for a mirror 
effect was found (i.e., more hits to unbelievable than to believable evidence statements), 
the false alarm rate difference was not significant, although in the predicted direction. 
Although the false alarm rate different between believable and unbelievable 
evidence was not technically significant, it is worthwhile to note that in both Experiment 
2 and 3 the false alarm rate difference was in the direction we had predicted.  
Furthermore, if we take our mirror effect predictions as strong a priori predictions, we 
could argue that a one-tailed test would be more appropriate in these cases, resulting in 
the false alarm rate difference being significant at p < .05.  However, as superficially 
related foils had been introduced specifically to examine whether believable and 




dual-process account of reasoning, an examination of those foils is actually more critical 
with respect to our theory than is the failure to find a significant false alarm rate 
difference. 
In terms of superficially related foils, recall that we predicted that false alarms for 
superficially related foils for studied unbelievable statements should be significantly 
higher than for studied believable statements.  This effect was found as predicted, t(36) = 
3.38, p < .01.  This finding confirms our earlier suggestions, that believable evidence 
statements may be more integrated with prior knowledge, with fewer surface 
characteristics having been encoded.  Unbelievable evidence statements on the other 
hand, may be stored in a less integrated, more detail-specific manner than believable 
statements.  Thus, believable evidence statements may have been encoded in a manner 
consistent with more primary processing having occurred in System 1, whereas 
unbelievable evidence statements may have been encoded in a manner consistent with 
more subsequent processing having occurred in System 2. 
Given that the results of the memory test confirm our earlier predictions about 
how evidence statements are memorized, we now turn to an examination of the inference 
data to investigate if similar effects to those seen in Experiment 2 are evident.  
 Inference Phase.  As in both Experiment 1 and 2, we were interested in examining 
the relative difference between accuracy judgments of inference statements in this 
experiment as compared to the normative data.  Thus, we examined the absolute 
inference change of inferences made based on believable and unbelievable evidence 




As in previous experiments, single-sample t-tests used to compare absolute 
inference changes against zero revealed that both believable (M = 2.10, SD = 0.51) and 
unbelievable evidence (M = 2.20, SD = 0.49) significantly altered accuracy judgments, 
t(36) = 24.91, p < .01, and t(36) = 28.90, p < .01, respectively.  Thus, believable and 
unbelievable evidence had an effect on inferences made.  However, of more interest was 
how the inferences made in this memory experiment compared to those of an online task, 
such as Experiment 1. 
A 2 (believable vs. unbelievable evidence) X 2 (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted to directly compare the results of Experiment 1 and 3.  
Believable evidence generally had a larger impact than unbelievable evidence, F(1, 74) = 
16.95, MSe = 0.17, p < .01, η
2
 = .19, and larger changes in inferences were noted in 
Experiment 3 versus Experiment 1, F(1, 74) = 15.47, MSe = 0.26, p < .01, η
2
 = .17.  
However, both of these main effects seemed driven by a significant interaction, F(1, 74) 
= 11.49, MSe = 0.17, p < .01, η
2
 = .13.  Specifically, believable evidence statements had 
a larger impact in this experiment than in Experiment 1, t(74) = 5.40, p < .01, d = 1.26, 
however unbelievable evidence statements had a similar impact in this experiment as in 
Experiment 1, t(74) = 0.88, p = .38, d = 0.20.  Additionally, in Experiment 2, believable 
evidence statements were found to have a larger impact than unbelievable statements on 
inferences, however, this effect was not evident in this experiment, t(36) = 0.57, p = .58.  
Thus, unlike Experiment 2 where unbelievable evidence statements had a lesser impact 
on inferences than in Experiment 1, in Experiment 3 their impact was equivalent to that 




According to our dual-process theory of reasoning, believable evidence 
statements should affect inferences to a much greater degree when being retrieved from 
memory than when provided.  This is because System 1 processing has integrated 
believable evidence with prior knowledge, and this prior knowledge could be 
inadvertently retrieved to support believable inferences, when participants attempt to 
retrieve a believable evidence statement.  In line with this suggestion, compared to 
Experiment 1, believable evidence statements were found to affect inferences more in 
this experiment.  Thus, compared to when believable and unbelievable evidence is given 
to participants, when retrieved from memory believable evidence has a larger effect on 
inferences, whereas, in this experiment, unbelievable information has a similar effect as 
when given.  
General Discussion 
 As researchers continue to investigate how individuals understand and use 
information that is either believable or unbelievable, the interaction between this factor 
and memory will become increasingly important.  That is, in everyday life, individuals 
often make judgments based on knowledge they posses, which sometimes can be either 
believable or unbelievable.  Very rarely are individuals being provided with all of the 
relevant information when making decisions, and so, they must rely on memory. 
 Our experiments demonstrate that participants make stronger inferences based on 
believable evidence when it was being retrieved from memory (Experiments 2 and 3) 
than when it was simply provided (Experiment 1).  For unbelievable evidence however, 
participants appeared to make similar inferences regardless of whether the unbelievable 




although there was some evidence participants may make less extreme inferences when 
unbelievable evidence is retrieved from memory (Experiment 2).   
 When initially considering the impact of unbelievable evidence statements 
retrieved from memory on inferences, we hypothesized that, because unbelievable 
evidence statements were more likely to receive additional processing by System 2, these 
items should be encoded in such a way that conscious recollection is later supported.  As 
these items had also not been integrated with prior knowledge, when participants attempt 
to retrieve a specific unbelievable evidence statement, they should be fairly good at 
recollecting the exact item they had studied.  Thus, to the degree that unbelievable 
evidence statements are successfully recollected, they should impact inferences in a 
similar manner as they did in an online task (i.e., Experiment 1).  However, in 
Experiment 2 unbelievable evidence statements had a lesser impact on inferences 
compared to Experiment 1, whereas in Experiment 3 they had a similar impact on 
inferences compared to Experiment 1. 
 One explanation for this result may have been that the introduction of 
superficially related foils to the memory test inadvertently improved the recollectability 
of unbelievable evidence statements.  That is, we hypothesized that superficially related 
foils for unbelievable evidence statements, by being so similar to the studied evidence 
statements, should be likely to cause participants to false alarm to these items.  However, 
a side effect of introducing these superficially related foils may have been that when a 
superficially related foil was seen, participants recollected the studied item which it 




unbelievable evidence statement twice: once when the studied item was presented, and 
once when the superficially related foil was presented. 
Past research has demonstrated that if participants are given practice in retrieving 
information, memory for that information actually improves, a phenomenon call the 
testing effect (e.g., Chan & McDermott, 2007; Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006).  
That is, although the initial intuition may be that, for the best final memory performance, 
participants should be given extra study time, the typical testing effect result is that 
practice test sessions actually improve final memory better than do extra study sessions.  
This finding has also been proposed as a possible explanation of the generation effect 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978).  The generation effect being the finding that items which are 
generated from a cue during study are better recognized than those simply read at study.  
One interpretation of this effect suggests that generated items are essentially retrieved 
from memory (i.e., past knowledge) based on the cue, whereas read items are simply 
perceived.  Through retrieval practice, generated items would therefore be predicted to be 
more memorable than read items, which is exactly what is found.  Of particular relevance 
for us, Chan and McDermott (2007) found that practice test sessions actually improve 
recollection on a recognition memory test, even if there is no detectable difference in hit 
rates between the extra study and the extra test conditions.  The implication for our work 
being that extra practice recollecting unbelievable items during the memory test may 
make those items more recollectable during the inferences phase. 
If we assume that in Experiment 3 participants recollect unbelievable evidence 
statements twice (i.e., once when the actual studied item is tested and once when the 




unbelievable evidence statements only once (i.e., only when the actual studied item is 
tested), we would predict that recollection for unbelievable evidence statements during 
the final, inference phase should be better in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2.  Further, 
our dual-process account of reasoning earlier proposed that, to the degree unbelievable 
evidence statements could be recollected, they should impact inferences similarly to an 
online task.  Thus, we would expect in Experiment 3, where participants have had more 
practice recollecting unbelievable evidence statements, that these unbelievable evidence 
statements would have, at most, an equal impact on inferences as in Experiment 1 (which 
is precisely what we found).  Furthermore, in Experiment 2, where participants received 
less practice recollecting unbelievable evidence statements during the memory test, these 
evidence statements may have been less recollectable during the inferences phase, and as 
a result have had a lesser impact on inference (which again, is precisely what we found). 
Thus, the differential impact of unbelievable evidence in Experiment 2 as 
compared to Experiment 3 may simply have been due to the fact that by introducing 
superficially related foils in Experiment 3, unbelievable evidence statements now had two 
opportunities to be retrieved.  This extra retrieval practice may have made unbelievable 
evidence statements particularly easy to recollect during the inferences phase of 
Experiment 3, resulting in these statements having a relatively larger impact compared to 
Experiment 2.  Finally, as believable evidence statements were suggested to be less likely 
to be processed by System 2, these items were also suggested to be less recollectable.  
Thus, these testing effects may be less relevant for believable evidence statements and 
indeed, no noticeably large difference was observed for believable evidence statements in 




In terms of Stanovich and West’s (1997) dual-process account of reasoning, these 
experiments provide some general support for that theory, especially if it takes into 
account the Spinozan model described by Gilbert (1991).  The combined account we 
outlined in the Introduction was able to make detailed predictions about how information 
should be processed and subsequently reveal itself in both a memory test and in an 
inferences task.  These predictions largely bore out in our results, supporting the account.   
Furthermore, these results suggest a possible connection between the areas of 
memory and reasoning research.  Namely, both the dual-process account of reasoning and 
of memory suggest that there are two fundamental processes or systems, one of which is 
automatic and unconscious (System 1 or familiarity) and the other which is attentive and 
consciously effortful (System 2 or recollection).  It is of particular interest to note that 
these two theories converge in the sense that, believable materials are predicted by the 
dual-process account of reasoning to rely more heavily on System 1 and predicted by the 
dual-process account of memory to be more influenced by familiarity.  Similarly, 
unbelievable materials are predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning to rely 
more heavily on System 2 and predicted by the dual-process account of memory to be 
more influenced by recollection.  Thus, these two theories appear to not only be 
compatible but perhaps to be cataloguing the same areas of mind as one another, albeit 
from slightly different perspectives.  This fact suggests that the dual-process accounts of 
reasoning may be informed from future work on the dual-process account of memory, 
and vice versa. 
As a case in point, our particular results highlight the fact that the effect of 




online or memory-based?  Memory-based tasks appear to exaggerate the influence of 
believable evidence while either shrinking that of unbelievable evidence or having no 
effect.  Future research would do well to take into account the type of task being used.  
Particularly, as most decisions in the real world are not online tasks, the effects of 
evidence on inferences and of premises on conclusions being examined in research may 
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Appendix A:  
 
Mean believability ratings and accuracy ratings for evidence statements and inference statements based on pre-testing measures 
 
Believable Sentence Mean   Unbelievable Sentence Mean   Inference Statement Mean 
93% of all greeting cards are 
purchased by women 
5.11  
10% of all greeting cards are 
purchased by women 
2.44  
Dads are more likely to buy greeting 
cards than moms 
2.22 
A dime has 118 ridges around 
the edge 
4.02  
A dime has 15 ridges around 
the edge 
2.89  
It's pretty hard to count all the ridges on 
a dime 
4.50 
A person uses 57 sheets of 
toilet paper each day 
3.70  
A person uses 8 sheets of 
toilet paper each day 
3.26  
People only use one or two pieces of 
toilet paper each time they go to the 
washroom 
2.14 
A toilet has 100 times more 
bacteria than an office desk 
3.82  
An office desk has 400 times 
more bacteria than an a toilet 
4.20  
Toilets are infested with more bacteria 
than other areas in the house or 
workplace 
3.36 
Chopsticks originated from 
China 4,000 years ago 
5.26  
Chopsticks originated from 
China 100 years ago 
2.91  
Chopsticks are a relatively modern 
invention 
1.64 
It costs 3 cents to make a $1 
bill in the United States 
4.47  
It costs $10 to make a $1 bill in 
the United States 
2.31  
It sometimes costs the government more 
to make a bill than the bill is worth 
3.14 
A disposable diaper can hold 
up to 7 pounds of liquid 
4.50  
A disposable diaper can hold 
up to 23 pounds of liquid 
2.36  
Disposable diapers can hold the weight 
of several children 
3.19 
The life span of a dollar bill is 1 
and 1/2 years 
2.84  
The life span of a dollar bill is 
16 years 
4.00  
Paper money is usually replaced every 
couple of years 
3.75 
1 billion Valentine's Day cards 
are sent each year in North 
America 
5.39  
500 Valentine's Day cards are 
sent each year in North 
America 
2.47  
Very few people actually send 
Valentine’s Day cards out 
3.17 
The average North American 
car contains 300 pounds of 
plastics 
4.28  
The average North American 
car contains 2,000 pounds of 
plastics 
3.09  
Most of the weight in cars nowadays is 
from plastics 
2.83 
There are 200 parts in a typical 
telephone 
4.09  
There are only 6 parts in a 
typical telephone 
3.74  
Phones actually have a lot of 
complicated parts inside 
5.22 
18% of a person’s income is 
spent on transportation 
4.91  
49% of a person’s income is 
spent on transportation 
3.41  






Appendix A Continued 
Believable Sentence Mean   Unbelievable Sentence Mean   Inference Statement Mean 
In 1962, the first Wal-Mart 
opened up in Rogers, 
Arkansas 
4.70  
In 1991, the first Wal-Mart 
opened up in Rogers, 
Arkansas 
3.23  
Walmart is a relatively new company 
4.58 
McDonald's restaurant has 
over 1.5 million employees all 
over the world 
6.13  
McDonald's restaurant has 
over 2,300 employees all over 
the world 
3.56  
McDonald's is a relatively large employer 
of people around the world 
5.64 
The United States Postal 
Service handles 40% of the 
world's mail volume 
4.46  
The United States Postal 
Service handles 99% of the 
world's mail volume 
2.89  
A letter mailed from anywhere in the 
world eventually passes through the US 
1.42 
25% of kids in the USA are 
overweight 
4.27  
85% of kids in the USA are 
overweight 
4.16  
Being overweight is still more uncommon 
for children than being a healthy weight 
3.75 
A blink lasts 0.3 seconds 
5.76  
A blink lasts 2.5 seconds 
1.93  
Blinks are large and noticeable motions 
6.17 
15% of the population is left-
handed 
5.15  
75% of the population is left-
handed 
1.96  
Most things are not left-handed because 
left-handed people are a minority 
6.17 
Each day 14 people die from 
asthma in North America 
4.48  
Each day 1.2 million people 
die from asthma in North 
America 
2.62  
Asthma kills hundreds of millions of 
people annually in North America 
3.03 
From all the oxygen that a 
human breathes, 20% goes to 
the brain 
4.33  
From all the oxygen that a 
human breathes, 95% goes to 
the brain 
3.98  
The brain needs oxygen to survive, the 
rest of the body doesn't really need 
oxygen much 
1.69 
It takes 3 hours for food to be 
broken down in the human 
stomach 
4.78  
It takes 2 weeks for food to be 
broken down in the human 
stomach 
1.91  
Your body is inefficient and takes many 
days to break down food 
2.00 
A person passes gas every 2 
hours 
4.76  
A person passes gas every 10 
minutes 
2.44  
Someone who passes gas a few times 
an hour is not having a normal day 
4.17 
People spend 33% of their life 
sleeping 
4.87  
People spend 62% of their life 
sleeping 
3.65  
People spend more time sleeping than 
awake 
1.94 
The average person falls 
asleep in 12 minutes 
4.36  
The average person falls 
asleep in 77 minutes 
2.51  
People usually fall asleep pretty quickly 
when they go to bed at night 
3.83 
American models are skinnier 
than 98% of American women 
5.63  
American models are skinnier 
than 12% of American women 
2.91  






Appendix A Continued 
Believable Sentence Mean   Unbelievable Sentence Mean   Inference Statement Mean 
The stomach of an adult can 
hold 1.5 litres of material 
5.11  
The stomach of an adult can 
hold 20 litres of material 
2.93  
One jug of pop is enough to fill up an 
adult's stomach 
4.14 
Women live 7 years longer 
than men do 
5.67  
Men live 15 years longer than 
women do 
1.85  
Grandma's usually outlive grandpa's 
5.75 
It takes 5 seconds for light to 
get from the sun to earth 
3.27  
It takes 8 minutes for light to 
get from the sun to earth 
4.27  
Light can travels vast distances in space 
almost instantaneously 
5.31 
Roses need 6 hours of sunlight 
per day to grow properly 
4.80  
Roses need 20 minutes of 
sunlight per day to grow 
properly 
4.18  
Roses can grow even with very little 
sunlight 
3.31 
90 people that have been 
frozen after their death 
4.07  
700,000 people that have been 
frozen after their death 
2.60  
Asking to be frozen after your death is a 
fairly rare request 
5.06 
25% of injuries by athletes 
involve the wrist and hand 
4.62  
4% of injuries by athletes 
involve the wrist and hand 
3.42  
Common injuries for athletes involve 
hands and wrists 
4.67 
38% of Americans eat 
breakfast everyday 
4.64  
6% of Americans eat breakfast 
everyday 
3.07  
No one really eats breakfast every day 
2.31 
An average American eats 60 
hot dogs per year 
4.49  
An average American eats 7 
hot dogs per year 
2.87  
Hot dogs are actually rarely eaten by 
Americans 
1.83 
Heinz first started making 
ketchup in 1876 
5.20  
Heinz first started making 
ketchup in 1233 AD 
1.82  
Heinz has been a merchant since the 
medieval times 
2.03 
In a year, an American kid eats 
46 slices of pizza 
4.76  
In a year, an American kid eats 
3 slices of pizza 
1.64  
Kids like pizza and eat a good amount in 
a year 
5.53 
80% of households have 
oatmeal in their kitchen 
4.13  
99% of households have 
oatmeal in their kitchen 
2.77  
It is incredibly rare to find a household 
that doesn’t have oatmeal in it 
3.17 
90% of Pumpkins sold are for 
decoration 
5.07  
15% of Pumpkins sold are for 
decoration 
3.80  
Most pumpkins are sold around 
Halloween to make jack-o-laterns 
5.61 
The Snickers chocolate bar 
was invented in 1930 
4.91  
The Snickers chocolate bar 
was invented in 1996 
2.24  
Snickers has been around since the 
Great Depression 
3.94 
A crocodile can run up to a 
speed of 16 kilometres per 
hour 
4.39  
A crocodile can run up to a 
speed of 100 kilometres per 
hour 
2.63  
Crocodiles can run at highway speeds 





Appendix A Continued 
Believable Sentence Mean   Unbelievable Sentence Mean   Inference Statement Mean 
A leech has 1 brain 
5.13  
A leech has 32 brains 
2.23  
You can't cut off a leeches head because 
it has brains all over its body 
2.89 
A female mouse can produce 
up to 100 babies a year 
4.67  
A female mouse can produce 
up to 200,000 babies a year 
2.54  
A handful of mice can produce millions of 
babies per year 
4.11 
Rats can survive up to 14 days 
without any food 
4.93  
Rats can only survive for 20 
minutes without any food 
2.04  
Rats usually fast for several days at a 
time as food is usually scarce 
4.67 
Alaska has 2 times as many 
caribou as people 
4.42  
Alaska has 100 times as many 
people as caribou 
3.16  
Alaska has more wildlife than people 
5.14 
31% of employees skip lunch 
entirely 
4.93  
85% of employees skip lunch 
entirely 
3.29  
Eating lunch at work is not the norm 
5.86 
25% of Americans don't know 
that the sun is a star 
4.40  
95% of Americans don't know 
that the sun is a star 
3.65  
Only scientists tend to know that the sun 
is a star 
4.08 
85% of weddings are held in a 
synagogue or church 
5.02  
7% of weddings are held in a 
synagogue or church 
2.36  
People usually get married in religiously 
sacred buildings 
4.75 
96% of candles that are 
purchased are purchased by 
women 
5.15  
8% of candles that are 
purchased are purchased by 
women 
2.13  
Boyfriends are more likely to buy candles 
than girlfriends 
1.78 
women spend 55 minutes per 
day getting showered and 
dressed 
5.07  
women spend 3 hours per day 
getting showered and dressed 
3.38  
Women usually wake up an hour early to 
get ready in the morning 
4.97 
40% of the states in the U.S. 
have severe, or extreme 
pollution problems 
4.91  
90% of the states in the U.S. 
have severe, or extreme 
pollution problems 
4.11  
Pollution still isn't a major problem for 
most of the states in the US 
2.67 
5% of the people who use 
personal ads for dating are 
already married 
4.53  
62% of the people who use 
personal ads for dating are 
already married 
3.07  
If you meet a person from a personal ad, 
chances are they are already married 
2.67 
33% of accidental deaths 
occur in the home 
4.43  
99% of accidental deaths 
occur in the home 
2.84  
You're more likely to die during work, 
school, or in transit than at home 
3.81 
93% of children go out trick or 
treating for Halloween 
4.84  
17% of children go out trick or 
treating for Halloween 
2.50  












Appendix A Continued 
Believable Sentence Mean   Unbelievable Sentence Mean   Inference Statement Mean 
8% of men are color blind 
5.02  
71% of men are color blind 
2.80  
The reason most men are bad at colour-
coordinating is that they are colour blind 
2.28 
Only 4% of babies are born on 
their actual due date 
4.46  
79% of babies are born on 
their actual due date 
3.80  
Doctor's are remarkably accurate in 
predicting the exact day a baby will be 
born 
3.17 
50% of lottery players go back 
to work after winning the 
jackpot 
4.67  
92% of lottery players go back 
to work after winning the 
jackpot 
4.28  
Pretty much no one quits their job when 
they win the jackpot in a lottery 
3.25 
30% of the human population 
reside in deserts 
3.86  
70% of the human population 
reside in deserts 
2.47  
Most cultures around the world are 
desert-dwelling cultures 
5.19 
40% of people end up 
marrying their first love 
3.84  
90% of people end up 
marrying their first love 
2.65  
The reason most marriages end if 
divorce is that most people marry their 
first love 
2.03 
In the United States, 33% of 
land is covered by forests 
4.64  
In the United States, 87% of 
land is covered by forests 
2.85  
If you drive across the US most of the 
drive you will be driving through forests 
2.19 
12 men have landed on and 
explored the moon 
3.98  
216 men have landed on and 
explored the moon 
2.78  
Because moon missions are so rare, 
only a handful of men have ever landed 
on the moon 
5.06 
Hitler was voted Time 
Magazine's man of the year in 
1938 
3.95  
Hitler was voted Time 
Magazine's man of the year in 
1981 
2.59  
Before World War II Hitler was actually a 
popular leader due to his economic 
reforms 
5.36 
The world's tallest roller 
coaster reaches a peak height 
of 72 meters 
4.73  
The world's tallest roller 
coaster reaches a peak height 
of 6 meters 
2.02  
The world's tallest roller coaster is about 
as tall as a tall man 
1.14 
James Bond made his debut in 
the 1952 novel "Casino 
Royale" 
4.38  
James Bond made his debut in 
the 1765 novel "Casino 
Royale" 
3.11  
The first James Bond tale was written 
hundreds of years ago 
2.50 
Majority of brides plan their 
wedding for 9 months 
5.43  
Majority of brides plan their 
wedding for 5 years 
2.45  
Most weddings are planned in under a 
year and therefore require the help of a 
wedding planner 
2.36 
